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 We investigate the stock returns subsequent to large quarterly earnings surprises, where 
the benchmark for an earnings surprise is the consensus analyst forecast.  By defining the 
surprise relative to an analyst forecast rather than a time-series model of expected earnings, we 
document returns subsequent to earnings announcements that are much larger, persist for much 
longer, and are more heavily concentrated in the long portion of the hedge portfolio than shown 
in previous studies.  We show that our results hold after controlling for risk and previously 
documented anomalies, and are positive for every quarter between 1988 and 2000.  Finally, we 
explore the financial results and information environment of firms with extreme earnings 
surprises and find that they tend to be “neglected” stocks with relatively high book to market 
ratios, low analyst coverage, and high analyst forecast dispersion.  In the three subsequent years, 
firms with extreme positive earnings surprises tend to have persistent earnings surprises in the 
same direction, strong growth in cash flows and earnings, and large increases in analyst 
coverage, relative to firms with extreme negative earnings surprises. 
  
Keywords: Earnings Surprise, Abnormal Returns, Market Inefficiency 




JEL classification: M4 
We thank workshop participants at the Carnegie Mellon summer camp, the London Business 
School, the University of Michigan, Queens University and the American Accounting 
Association 2004 Annual Meeting.
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper investigates firms’ stock returns subsequent to large earnings surprises.  By 
defining earnings surprises relative to the IBES consensus forecasts, rather than using a time-
series model to define expected earnings, we document subsequent returns that are much larger 
and more persistent than shown in prior studies.  We find that firms with large positive earnings 
surprises experience large positive stock returns over the three years subsequent to the earnings 
announcement.  We also find that firms with negative earnings surprises experience negative 
stock returns over the subsequent three years, although the effect is less pronounced than for 
positive surprises.    A hedge portfolio that takes a long position in the top decile of earnings 
surprises and a short position in the bottom decile of earnings surprises returns 14 percent in the 
year following the earnings announcement and 20 percent in the following two years.   These 
results hold after controlling for risk, as measured by beta, size and the book-to-market ratio, and 
they hold after controlling for other documented market anomalies, including price momentum, 
accruals, pro forma exclusions and post-earnings-announcement-drift based on a time-series 
model of unexpected earnings.  We show that our results are not concentrated in only a few 
industries and are not sensitive to whether we scale the surprise measure by price or total assets.  
We also show that our results are unaffected by the method of controlling for risk.  In particular, 
the hedge returns are very similar when risk is measured by the excess market return over 
another sample firm with similar size and book-to-market ratio, as advocated in Barber and Lyon 
[1997].  Finally, regardless of the risk control used, the hedge returns are positive in nearly every 
future return window during the sample period.  The magnitude of the returns, and the fact that 
most of the hedge returns come from the long position, make it unlikely that transaction costs 
can explain the results. 
The earnings announcement is one of the biggest news events in the quarter and the 
interpretation of an extreme earnings surprise is relatively obvious.  Given this, we investigate 
why the market fails to properly react to this well-publicized event and what leads to the price 
correction over the next few years.  We find that at the time of the announcement, firms with 
extreme earnings surprises are generally smaller than the average firm, but they are not trivially 
small, with the top decile of earnings surprise firms averaging over $600 million in market value.   
Firms with extreme earnings surprises also have relatively low analyst coverage, but they are not 
without any coverage, averaging three analysts who submit forecasts to IBES.  We also find that 
there is a relatively wide dispersion in analyst forecasts for the most extreme earnings surprise 
firms.  In the three years following the earnings surprise, both the most extreme negative surprise 
firms and the most extreme positive surprise firms have the highest sales growth.  However, 
firms reporting extreme good news have large increases in future cash flows and future earnings 
while firms reporting extreme bad news have much smaller increases in future cash flows and 
decreases in earnings.  In addition, over the following three years the analyst forecast dispersion 
narrows for both groups of firms and analyst coverage significantly increases for the firms with 
extreme good news. 
Three different literatures have examined stock returns subsequent to earnings surprises.  
First, a large number of papers have studied post-earnings announcement drift, where the 
benchmark for “earnings news” is the deviation from a seasonal random walk with drift, scaled 
by the standard deviation of prior earnings surprises (e.g. Ball and Brown [1968], Foster, Olsen 
and Shevlin [1984], Bernard and Thomas [1989, 1990], and Freeman and Tse [1989]; more 
recently, Johnson and Schwartz [2001], and Chordia and Shivakumar [2004]).  Representing 
some of the earliest market inefficiency evidence, the main results are that the return over the 12 
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months following the earnings announcement is approximately 8 percent higher for firms in the 
top decile of earnings news than for firms in the bottom decile [Bernard and Thomas 1990, Table 
2].  Further, the returns are realized largely around the next quarterly earnings announcement and 
there is no systematic drift, even for small firms, beyond nine months [Bernard and Thomas 
1989, p. 12].  This market inefficiency appears to be caused by market participants’ inability to 
fully incorporate the future predictability of the true earnings time series into their decisions at 
the earnings announcement date, either because they use a naïve expectation model [Bernard and 
Thomas 1990], because they underestimate the serial correlation in seasonal differences [Ball 
and Bartov 1996], or because they fail to take inflation into account [Chordia and Shivakumar 
2004].  However, recent evidence in Johnson and Schwartz [2001] shows that the drift based on 
the time-series model of unexpected earnings has largely been eliminated in the 1991-1997 
period.   
 A related set of papers uses analyst forecasts as the benchmark for an earnings surprise.  
Using Valueline forecasts, Abarbanell and Bernard [1992] report an eight percent hedge return 
between the top and bottom deciles of earnings surprise over the year following the earnings 
announcement, noting that the result is quite comparable to the previous evidence that used a 
time series model as the surprise benchmark.1  Liang [2003] documents a 5.8% hedge return over 
the 60 days following the earnings announcement using IBES analyst forecasts as the surprise 
benchmark, and shows that the size of the drift is related to the heterogeneity of analyst forecast 
errors.  However, her tests have a look-ahead bias and she does not examine returns beyond 60 
                                                 
1 Abarbanell and Bernard also show that Valueline analysts underreact to earnings news in the same way that the 
market does, but that their underreaction is not nearly large enough to explain the magnitude of the post-earnings-
announcement drift.  Shane and Brous [2001] extend Abarbanell and Bernard’s results by showing that 
approximately 46% of the drift is corrected by the subsequent earnings announcement and associated analyst 
forecast revisions. 
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days.2  Finally, Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok [1996] evaluate a trading strategy based on a 
moving average of analyst forecast revisions and find a 7.6% annual return after controlling for 
firm size, although the return is reduced to 3.1% after adding controls for prior stock returns and 
the earnings surprise based on a time-series model of expected earnings. 
 Recently a number of papers have examined the stock price behavior of firms who “meet 
or beat” the consensus analyst forecast versus those who miss the analyst forecast.  Bartov, 
Givoly and Hayn [2002] and Kasznik and McNichols [2002] both find a market premium at the 
time of the announcement to meeting or beating the consensus analyst forecast, although both 
studies report no systematic difference in the stock returns between the two sets of firms over the 
subsequent three years.  Bhorjraj, Hribar and Picconi [2003] examine the conflicting signals that 
arise when a firm beats the consensus forecast by one cent but has low earnings quality (as 
measured by accruals, R&D expenditures and advertising expenditures) versus a firm who 
misses the forecast by one cent yet has high earnings quality.  They find that in the short run 
beating or missing the forecast is the dominant effect in future returns but that in the long run 
earnings quality is the dominant effect.  Controlling for earnings quality, firms who beat the 
forecast by one cent have three year future returns that are 7% higher than firms who miss the 
forecast by one cent. 
 Our results are similar to the findings in the post-earnings-announcement drift literature 
in that we document an under-reaction to an earnings surprise, but it differs from this work in 
two important ways.  First, by using the consensus analyst forecast as the benchmark for the 
earnings surprise, we find subsequent stock returns that continue two years longer and are three 
times larger than the results shown in the traditional drift literature.  Second, by using IBES 
                                                 
2In particular, Liang’s change in uncertainty variable uses information after the earnings announcement to form 
portfolios. 
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forecasts instead of Valueline forecasts and by extending the return window beyond 60 days, we 
document significantly more drift than found in Abarbanell and Bernard [1992] and Liang 
[2003]. 
 Our study is similar to the “meet or beat” literature because we use the consensus forecast 
as the benchmark for an earnings surprise, but by focusing on the extreme surprises, we answer a 
different question than the one this literature has addressed.  The “meet or beat” literature is 
interested in behavior immediately around zero surprise because this is where incentives to 
manage earnings and analyst expectations are the greatest; consequently, there are many subtle 
management actions and investor inferences at play.  In contrast, it is very unlikely that a firm 
ended up in one of our extreme portfolios of earnings surprise because of any earnings 
management activity.  Our study is about the market’s inability to interpret of a very 
straightforward earnings signal without the confounding influence of earnings management.   
 Our results are surprisingly simple: firms who report a large positive earnings surprise do 
much better than expected in the future and firms who report a large negative earnings surprise 
do somewhat worse than expected.  Although it changes from quarter to quarter, the cutoff to be 
in the most extreme decile of positive earnings surprises is to beat the consensus analyst 
forecasted quarterly earnings-per-share by approximately half of one percent of the price per 
share at the end of the fiscal quarter.   Historically, these firms beat the market by 15 percent 
over the next two years (19 percent if we restrict the sample to firms with sufficient data to 
control for risk and other anomalies).  The fact that most of the hedge portfolio return is earned 
by the decile of firms in the long position is unusual in the literature of market anomalies and 
greatly enhances the implementability of a trading strategy based on extreme earnings surprises.   
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 In the next section we describe our variables and return calculations, methodology and 
descriptive statistics, in section III we present all our evidence documenting the abnormal stock 
returns related to extreme earnings surprises.  With the size and nature of the market inefficiency 
described, section IV explores the cause of this anomaly.  We conclude in section V. 
 
II.   METHODOLOGY, VARIABLE MEASUREMENT AND SAMPLE 
 We document remarkably large returns to a very simple investment strategy.  To be 
certain that these returns are from an implementable investment strategy, we take extra steps in 
our research design to avoid any bias.  In particular, we avoid a look-ahead bias in our tests by 
using only information that would have been known at the time the portfolios were formed.  We 
also avoid survivorship bias by calculating the subsequent returns for all firms that were present 
at the time of portfolio formation, regardless of whether or not they were subsequently delisted.   
 To be precise, for every firm with sufficient independent variable information at the 
earnings announcement date, we compute market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns (inclusive of 
dividends and other distributions) beginning two days after the announcement date and extending 
one, two or three years into the future.  For firms that are delisted during the future return period 
we calculate the remaining return by taking CRSP’s delisting return and then reinvesting the 
proceeds in the value-weighted market portfolio.  For firms that were delisted due to poor 
performance (delisting codes 500 and 520-584), we use a –35% delisting return for 
NYSE/AMEX firms and a –55% delisting return for NASDAQ firms, as recommended in 
Shumway [1997] and Shumway and Warther [1999].3  Because we focus on returns to hedge 
portfolios that have equal long and short positions, the market adjustment to the returns has no 
                                                 
3 Firms delisting due to poor performance constitute 0.87%, 1.72%, and 2.25% of our sample for the 1-year, 2-year 
and 3-year return windows, respectively.  Practically speaking, our results are almost identical if we ignore the 
Shumway and Warther delisting correction. 
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effect.  However, it does aid in interpreting the returns to an unhedged portfolio (for example, a 
portfolio that invests only in the highest decile of earnings surprises).4  The resulting stock 
returns for one, two and three years subsequent to the earnings announcement for fiscal quarter t 
are labeled, Ret1yrt, Ret2yrt and Ret3yrt, respectively (firm indexing is suppressed).   
 The main independent variable in the study is the earnings surprise for quarter t, labeled 
Surpriset.  It is defined as the un-split-adjusted IBES actual earnings per share for quarter t less 
the most recent IBES median forecast preceding the announcement date, scaled by the market 
price per share at the end of quarter t.   In untabulated results we also use total assets per share at 
the end of quarter t-1 as the deflator (computed as Compustat data item #44 divided by data item 
#15) and get almost identical results. Using price as the deflator has the logical disadvantage of 
referring to a market-based measure at the same time that we are positing that the market is 
inefficient.  However, using price per share has the advantage that both the numerator and the 
denominator of the Surpriset variable are taken from IBES; whereas total assets per share must 
be constructed from Compustat data.5   
 For future return tests it is important to use the un-split-adjusted IBES database rather 
than manually un-split-adjusting the more commonly used split-adjusted IBES database.  The 
un-split-adjusted database gives the earnings per share that was actually reported in the 
company’s earnings announcement, which is the news that the market observed at the time.  In 
contrast, since IBES limits the number of significant digits in their split-adjusted data set, it is 
impossible in many cases to manually un-split-adjust the data to generate the earnings data that 
                                                 
4 Continuing the example, to realize the reported market-adjusted return on a portfolio that is long in the highest 
decile of earnings surprises you would buy an equally weighted portfolio of all these stocks and sell short the value-
weighted market index by the same dollar amount. 
5 Another problem with using total assets per share as the deflator is that it may not be known at the earnings 
announcement date.  To avoid a potential look-ahead bias, we used total assets per share at the end of quarter t-1 for 
this specification check.  
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was originally reported at the time the earnings announcement was made.  In particular, for firms 
that have split their stock frequently, manually un-split-adjusting the data causes many earnings 
surprises to be coded as zero when they were actually non-zero at the time they were reported 
(see Baber and King 2002 and Payne and Thomas 2003).6  More generally, the split adjustment 
is made to the historical data ex-post and, consequently, could induce a look-ahead bias in our 
tests.7
 Because the un-split-adjusted IBES data is less frequently used in past research, and 
because we document large abnormal returns, we hand-collect additional press release and stock 
return data to verify the fidelity of the IBES data.  First, if something about the use of the un-
split-adjusted data is creating a hindsight bias then this effect would be most pronounced for 
firms with the largest split factors.  To investigate this, we examine the 50 firms in our data that 
have a split factor of 16 or greater.  For each observation we compare the earliest available IBES 
actual EPS in the un-split-adjusted database with the actual press release found on Lexis-Nexis.  
In all 50 cases, the data in IBES matched the data in the original press release; capital market 
participants had the necessary data to compute the surprise variable at the time of portfolio 
formation.  Second, because our returns are large and positive in portfolio 10, we randomly 
select 50 observations from this portfolio and compute the one-year, two-year and three-year 
buy-and-hold returns by hand.  Using the price, dividend and split data from Yahoo!, we find 
that these extreme returns did indeed occur as reported by CRSP. 
                                                 
6 As an example, Baber and Kang (2002) show that between 1993 and 1999 Dell’s actual EPS beat the consensus 
forecast in 18 out of 24 quarters, yet the adjusted IBES data show a zero forecast error in 23 of the 24 quarters.  Dell 
split its stock two-for-one six times during this period. 
7 Although the un-split-adjusted IBES data is clearly superior on conceptual grounds, as a practical matter there are 
not many firms in our sample that are affected by this problem.  We also run our tests by manually un-split-adjusting 
the traditional split-adjusted data and find very similar results. 
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We form portfolios based on the earnings surprise variable using a variation of the 
standard decile ranking procedure.  The standard procedure sorts the independent variables into 
deciles each period, assigns each observation its decile rank ranging between zero and nine, and 
then divides each decile rank by nine to yield a variable that takes on ten values ranging between 
zero and one [see Fama and MacBeth 1973 or Bernard and Thomas 1990].  The advantage of this 
procedure is that, by regressing returns on these transformed variables, the coefficient on the 
independent variable corresponds to the return earned on an equally-weighted portfolio that takes 
a long position in the top decile of the variable (coded as one) and a short position in the bottom 
decile of the variable (coded as zero).8  However, sorting firms each period creates a look-ahead 
bias because, at the earnings announcement date for a particular firm, the earnings surprise for all 
other firms in that quarter may not yet be known.  To avoid this bias we use the cut-off values 
that define the deciles of earnings surprises from period t-1 to sort the earnings surprises for 
period t into ten groups, consistent with Bernard and Thomas [1989] and Collins and Hribar 
[2000].  The result is that not all ten groups have the same number of observations but otherwise 
the interpretation of the results is the same as for the standard procedure.9  We use the same 
coding procedure based on the lagged decile cutoffs for the other independent variables in the 
multiple regressions. 
 To rule out the possibility that our hedge returns are simply capturing differential risk 
across the portfolios or are proxying for a previously-documented market anomaly, we estimate 
multiple regressions using control variables.  As with the earnings surprise variable, each control 
                                                 
8 The exact portfolio that corresponds to a particular regression of returns on a matrix of regressors denoted by X 
puts small positive or negative weights on all the observations, not just those in the top or bottom deciles.  The exact 
weights sum to zero and are given by the rows of the matrix (X’X)-1X’. 
9 In the typical quarter more than 10 percent of the earnings surprises have the value of zero.  In this case we assign 
all zeros the same decile rank (most often 5).  While this causes the groups adjacent to the group of zeros to have 
proportionally fewer observations, it preserves the proper rank-ordering of the data. 
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variable is sorted into ten groups each quarter and the cut-off values between deciles from fiscal 
quarter t-1 are used to sort the values into ten groups in quarter t.  Each value is then replaced by 
its group ranked zero to nine and then scaled by nine.  The risk controls are Betat, estimated 
using weekly returns over the two years prior to the end of fiscal quarter t; Sizet, defined as the 
log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal quarter t (data item #61 times data item 
#14); and Book to Markett, constructed as the book value of equity (data item #60) at the end of 
fiscal quarter t divided by the market value of equity at the end of fiscal quarter t (see Fama and 
French 1993 for a discussion of each risk control).  We control for the accruals anomaly [Sloan 
1996], where Accrualst are computed as GAAP earnings per share (data item #19) minus cash 
from operations per share (data item #108), scaled by market price per share at the end of fiscal 
quarter as reported by IBES.  Although it is mostly a short-run anomaly, we also control for 
Momentumt, calculated as the market-adjusted stock return for the six months prior to the earning 
announcement [see Chan et al. 1996].  Because it is also based on IBES data, we control for the 
“pro forma exclusions” anomaly described in Doyle et al. [2003].  Pro Forma Exclusionst are 
measured as the un-split-adjusted IBES actual earnings per share for quarter t less the GAAP 
earnings per share for quarter t, using either basic (data item #19) or diluted (data item #9), 
depending on the IBES basic/diluted flag, and scaled by market price per share at the end of 
quarter.  Finally, we control for the traditional post-earnings-announcement drift anomaly by 
including the standardized unexpected earnings SUEt, computed as in Bernard and Thomas 
[1990].  The numerator is equal to actual earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat data 
item #8) minus an expectation based on a seasonal random walk with trend.  The trend is 
calculated as the mean seasonal change in actual earnings beginning with the prior quarter and 
using up to 36 quarters of history, if available.  The denominator of SUE is the standard 
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deviation of this measure of unexpected earnings over the past eight quarters.  If there are less 
than eight observations to compute the trend and standard deviation, the observation is deleted.  
Consistent with prior literature, the SUE variable is winsorized at values -5 and 5.  Putting this 
all together, we have the following regression: 
 
Future Returnt = α0 + α1Surpriset + α2Betat + α3Sizet + α4Book to Markett 
      + α5Accrualst + α6Momentumt + α7Pro Forma Exclusionst + α8SUEt + εt,       (1) 
 
where the Future Returnt is either Ret1yrt, Ret2yrt or Ret3yrt. 
 
 The collective data requirements for the four prior anomaly variables eliminate over 
40,000 observations, so we also estimate a regression with only Surpriset and the three risk 
control variables: 
 
Future Returnt = α0 + α1Surpriset + α2Betat + α3Sizet + α4Book to Markett + εt.      (2)
 
We estimate the regressions quarterly and report the mean coefficient estimates in the tables.  
The t-statistics are computed using the quarterly estimates [Fama and MacBeth 1973] where the 
standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation in the estimates using the Newey-West 
correction (see Verbeek, 2000, p. 104 for details). 
 As an additional test to rule out possibility that differential risk is behind our results, we 
employ the matched control firm method advocated in Barber and Lyon [1997].  For each firm-
quarter we select a control firm whose market value is between 0.70 and 1.30 times the treatment 
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firm’s market value and has the closest book-to-market ratio to the treatment firm at the end of 
the fiscal quarter.  We then calculate the risk-adjusted return as the difference between the 
treatment firm’s return and the control firm’s return over one, two or three years, labeled as 
ARet1yrt, ARet2yrt or ARet3yrt, respectively.  The advantage of this approach is that any bias that 
might be due to the composition of the sample is present in both the treatment and control firm 
returns.  Further, this approach does not depend on the validity of the linear rank regression 
specification; its weakness is that it can only control for a limited number of factors.10
 Other variables used in the subsequent analysis are Sales (Compustat data item #2) and 
Cash from Operations (data item #108), each scaled by the market value of equity at the end of 
quarter t (data item #61 times data item #14) to be consistent with the scale variable for 
Surpriset.  Similarly, GAAP Earnings per share (data item #19) for quarter t is scaled by market 
price per share (data item #14).  Number of Analysts is the number of analysts making earnings 
forecasts at quarter t, as reported by IBES.  Forecast Dispersion is the standard deviation of 
analysts’ earnings forecasts for quarter t, as reported by IBES.  We also compute the change in 
the above variables over the three years subsequent to quarter t. 
 
The Sample 
 The least restrictive sample consists of 159,789 firm-quarters between the years of 1988 
and 2000 with sufficient CRSP and IBES data to compute Surpriset in at least one quarter and at 
least one year of subsequent returns.  As discussed earlier, if a firm delisted subsequent to the 
earnings announcement date for quarter t it still remains in the sample, but with its subsequent 
                                                 
10 Barber and Lyon show that controlling for risk using a matched control firm approach is preferred to including 
reference portfolio returns, such as a market index return or the Fama-French size and book-to-market portfolio 
factors in a regression.   The reference portfolios and the Fama-French factors refer to a larger set of data than is in 
the sample, raising the possibility that a bias is introduced when newly listed firms are added to the reference 
portfolio or included in the Fama-French factor but are not present in the sample. 
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return constructed from its delisting return and the value-weighted market index.  Table 1 gives 
the descriptive statistics for our sample.  The mean stock return is slightly positive for one year 
ahead and slightly negative for two and three years ahead; the medians are negative due to the 
well-documented skewness in returns.  The median Surprise is zero, meaning that the median 
firm met its analyst forecast for the quarter during our sample period.  The distribution of 
Surprise is also reasonably symmetric.  Although the exact cutoffs for the 10th percentile and 90th 
percentile of Surprise vary by period, the average values over all periods are –0.0120 and 0.0052, 
respectively (recall that this is scaled by price per share from the fiscal quarter end). The mean 
firm has a market value of $1,737 million, but the distribution is positively skewed, with a 
median of $293 million.  The distribution of size is also quite large, ranging from $97 million for 
the 25th percentile to $1,040 million for the 75th percentile.  Finally, the median firm has three 
analysts reporting to IBES. 
 
III. FUTURE RETURNS TO EARNINGS SURPRISE INVESTMENT STRATEGY 
 We begin by reporting the mean future returns for each of the ten portfolios of earnings 
surprises, where the cutoffs between groups are determined by the decile ranking from the 
previous quarter (as discussed earlier).  The results are based on the full sample of 159,789 firm-
quarters, and are shown in Table 2.  The first thing to note in Table 2 is the hedge return.  In the 
first year subsequent to the earnings announcement date, firms in the top decile of earnings 
surprise earn a return that is 13.95% higher than firms in the bottom decile of earnings surprise.  
This is considerably higher than the eight percent return documented in the prior literature 
(where surprise is relative to a time series model).  Further, the hedge return increases an 
additional 6 percent in the second year, to 19.89%, before starting to flatten out in the third 
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year.11  Further, these results are not due to a single unusual period; the two-year hedge return is 
positive in 44 out of 47 quarters. 
The second thing to note in Table 2 is that there is no consistent ordering of portfolio 
returns over the firms in the negative surprise portfolios (portfolios one through five).  The most 
extreme negative earnings surprise is not even the lowest return for two-year and three-year 
future returns.12   In contrast, the subsequent returns for the good news portfolios (portfolios six 
through ten) are almost perfectly ordered for all three return periods.   
The final observation from Table 2 is that roughly two-thirds of the hedge return comes 
from holding the long position in the portfolio of firms with the largest earnings surprises.  This 
is noteworthy because the transaction costs associated with a short position are considerably 
higher than for a long position.  A very simple investment strategy coming from Table 2 would 
be to simply go short in the value-weighted market index and long in firms with earnings 
surprises that are greater than 0.52% of the fiscal quarter end price (i.e. portfolio 10).  This 
strategy would have earned a 14.93% return over the two years following the earnings 
announcement.13
 Our next set of tests examines the future returns associated with an earnings surprise after 
controlling for risk and other documented market anomalies.  Table 3 shows the results from 
estimating regression (1) over different return horizons.  Recall that this regression is estimated 
                                                 
11 In untabulated results, we find that the fourth and fifth years after portfolio formation have no significant 
incremental returns beyond the year three return. 
12 Note that the mean stock returns in the three days around the earnings announcement are perfectly ordered across 
the ten portfolios of earning surprises, as shown later in Table 5.  So, while the portfolio with the worst news had the 
most negative announcement period return, other portfolios actually had lower subsequent returns. 
13 As another reference point, we examined the size of the traditional post-earnings-announcement drift for our 
sample, which is from a later time period than studied by the bulk of the earlier literature.  We sorted firms into 
deciles based on the SUEt variable and used the cutoffs between deciles in quarter t-1 to create 10 portfolios in 
quarter t.  The returns to a hedge portfolio that is long in the top decile and short in the bottom decile for one, two, 
and three years ahead are 3.2%, 3.5% and 3.8%, respectively.  The fact that the return to this strategy in a more 
recent period is smaller than documented during the earlier time periods is consistent with Johnson and Schwartz 
(2001). 
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separately for each quarter and the mean coefficients are tabulated.14  In addition, the coefficient 
estimate from this regression corresponds to the estimated difference in returns between the top 
and bottom portfolios for that variable, controlling for the other variables in the regression.  As 
seen in Table 3, the association between an earnings surprise and future returns is highly 
significant for all three return intervals and the estimated returns are similar in magnitude to the 
simple hedge returns shown in Table 2.15  The estimated return is 9.7% after one year, 16.3% 
after two years and 19.7% after three years.  The incremental returns to trading on the Surpriset 
variable diminish noticeably after the second year.  There is very little additional return beyond 
year three; the mean coefficient on Surpriset in a regression with four years of future returns is 
20.5% (untabulated). 
 The control variables in Table 4 all show estimated relations with future returns that are 
consistent with prior studies.  The risk proxies Betat and Book-to-Markett are positively related to 
future returns and Sizet is negatively related to future returns.  The Book-to-Markett and Sizet 
variables are not significant in this multiple regression but become so in univariate regressions.  
The Accrualst variable is highly significant and at magnitudes consistent with Sloan [1996] and 
many other subsequent studies.  Momentumt is weakly significant in the first year, but not 
thereafter, consistent with the short-term nature of this anomaly [see Chan et al. 1996].  
Exclusionst is significantly negative, but not as extreme as the results shown in Doyle et al. 
[2003], because the sample is not limited to firms with non-zero pro forma exclusions, as in their 
                                                 
14 There are 52 quarters between 1988 and 2000.  Because we use the decile cut points from quarter t-1 to form 
portfolios in quarter t, we lose the first quarter of 1988.  Consequently, the one-year future return regressions are 
estimated for 51 quarters.  Because we don’t have CRSP data beyond 2001, the two-year and three-year future 
return regressions are estimated over 47 quarters and 43 quarters, respectively. 
15 Recall that the sample has changed considerably between Table 2, which has 159,789 observations for the one-
year returns and Table 3, which has only 85,368 observations for the one-year returns.   
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paper.  Finally, SUEt is insignificant for all return periods, consistent with the simple hedge 
return results from this variable reported in Footnote 13. 
 The data requirements for all the variables in Table 3 eliminate a very large portion of our 
original sample, mostly because of the data necessary to compute the SUEt variable.  For 
instance, the one-year return hedge portfolio results in Table 2 is based on 159,789 observations 
while the one-year return regression in Table 3 is based on only 85,368 observations.  Because 
Table 3 shows that the Surpriset variable is not merely proxying for SUEt or one of the other 
anomaly variables, we estimate regressions in Table 4 that include the risk controls but not the 
anomaly controls.  The less severe data requirements move the sample much closer to the simple 
hedge portfolio sample, with 126,108 observations in the one-year return regression.  The results 
in Table 4 show that the future returns associated with extreme earnings surprises are not due to 
risk; the coefficients on the Surprise variable are very close to the returns for simple hedge 
portfolio. 
 The results in Table 4 are not due to a few extreme quarters.  Figure 1 plots the estimated 
coefficient on Surpriset from the two-year return regressions for each quarter.  As seen in the 
figure, the coefficient is positive in 47 out of the available 47 quarters.  Similarly, the coefficient 
is positive 46/51 times in the one-year return regressions and is positive 40/43 times in the three-
year return regressions, as shown in the right-hand column of Table 4.  Because the returns 
extend over two years, the 47 bars in Figure 1 are not independent.  The statistical tests in tables 
3 and 4 take the overlapping periods into account but, as an alternative way to visualize the 
results, Figure 2 plots the one-year returns with no overlap in the data.  In particular, each graph 
shows the twelve estimated coefficients on Surpriset from twelve years of annual cross-sectional 
regressions based on equation (2), with no overlap in the annual periods.  To present all the data, 
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we plot a separate graph for each quarter.  With one small and one large exception, Figure 2 
shows that the returns are large and positive each year, regardless of when the annual returns 
begin. 
 As a specification check we replicated Tables 2, 3 and 4 using total assets as the scale 
variable for earnings surprise and the other financial statement variables.  Because total assets for 
the quarter may not be known at the earnings announcement date, we use total assets from the 
prior quarter to avoid a look-ahead bias.  The untabulated results are very similar to those 
reported here.  The two-year hedge return is 17.44% and the coefficient on Surpriset in the two-
year return regression that includes the risk control variables is 21.21%. 
 To see if the earnings surprise variable is simply identifying a few industries that, ex post, 
did unusually well over our sample period, we compare the full sample industry composition to 
the composition in the two extreme surprise portfolios.  As seen in Table 5, both extreme 
portfolios are well distributed across many industries, with no one industry dominating either 
portfolio.  The largest deviation from the full sample industry composition is probably in 
Business Services, which is under weighted in portfolio 10 by 1.5% and over weighted in 
portfolio 1 by 2.5%. 
 Finally, to control for risk without imposing the linear rank regression specification, we 
report the mean risk-adjusted returns to the ten portfolios, where the risk adjustment is made by 
subtracting the return for a matched control firm with a similar size and book-to-market ratio, as 
discussed earlier.  The results in Table 6 are very similar to the results reported in prior tables.  
The hedge returns for one, two and three years are 13.38%, 23.24% and 28.66%, respectively.  
And, like the results in table 2, over two-thirds of the hedge return is due to the long position in 
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portfolio 10; a long position in portfolio 10 yields returns that are 18% greater than the mean 
return for firms with similar size and book-to-market ratios over the next two years. 
 In summary, extreme earnings surprises are associated with unusually large future stock 
returns.  This result holds in simple hedge portfolios and in regressions that control for risk and 
other market anomalies.  The also hold when risk is controlled by a matched-control firm return.  
Further, the magnitude of the predictable future returns is far greater than in the post-earnings 
announcement drift literature and is slightly larger than the returns to the well-studied accruals 
anomaly. 
 
IV. WHY IS THE MARKET INEFFICIENT WITH RESPECT TO EXTREME 
EARNINGS SURPRISES? 
 In this section we explore why such large future returns are available by trading on what 
is arguably the firm’s most widely publicized news each quarter.  Why is the market so 
inefficient with respect to extreme earnings surprises?  We emphasize that this investigation is 
exploratory and the relations we observe may well be proxying for more fundamental drivers of 
market inefficiency.   
 Panel A of Table 7 describes various firm characteristics for each of the ten earnings 
surprise portfolios.   To begin, note that portfolios one and ten have the smallest firms, on 
average.  However, the average firm size in the portfolio is not trivial: the mean market value in 
portfolio one is $388 million and the mean market value in portfolio ten is $640 million.  The 
requirement that our firm have an IBES forecast eliminates many of the extremely small firms 
from the broader sample of publicly traded companies.  So the firms in the extreme earnings 
portfolios are smaller, but are not so small that it would be difficult purchase them.   
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 Next, note that portfolios one and ten have the highest mean book to market ratios at 0.84 
and 0.74, respectively.  The mean book to market ratio gets much smaller toward the middle of 
the portfolios, reaching a minimum of 0.41 in portfolio six.  Although it seems that high book to 
market “value” stocks are much more likely to generate an extreme earnings surprise, only the 
firms with the largest earnings surprises actually generate high future returns.16   
For the financial variables in Table 7 we report the medians because there are some 
extreme values that heavily influence the means.  All three variables, Salest, Cash from 
Operationst, and GAAP Earningst, are scaled by the market value at the end of the fiscal quarter 
(which is the same as the denominator for Surpriset).  Sales in the current quarter as a percent of 
market value is much higher for both the extreme negative and extreme positive earnings 
surprise portfolios than it is for the middle portfolios.  However, profitability, measured either as 
the median cash from operations or GAAP earnings, increases monotonically across the surprise 
portfolios, so the sales are profitable for the extreme positive surprise portfolio but are 
unprofitable for the extreme negative surprise portfolio.   
 Turning our attention to the information environment, the number of analysts and the 
standard deviation of their forecasts exhibit an interesting pattern across the earnings surprise 
portfolios.  Firms in the bottom and top surprise portfolios have the lowest analyst coverage, 
with 2.75 and 3.17 analysts submitting forecasts to IBES, respectively.  This compares to the 
sample average of 4.7 analysts shown in Table 1 or the approximately 6 analysts found in 
portfolios five and six.  This is consistent with the results in Gleason and Lee [2002] who find 
that the abnormal returns following an analyst forecast revision are smaller for firms with larger 
analyst coverage and for forecasts revisions from “celebrity” analysts.  The standard deviation of 
                                                 
16 We explicitly control for the book to market ratio in the regressions in Tables 3 and 4.  In untabulated results, we 
also find that our earnings surprise effect holds within each decile of the book to market ratio, generating  two-year 
returns in excess of 20% in each decile. 
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the analysts’ forecasts shows a similar pattern.  The disagreement between analysts is highest in 
the lowest surprise portfolio, decreases as the surprise increases to portfolio five and then 
increases again over portfolios six through ten.  In sum, there are fewer analysts following the 
firms with the most extreme earnings surprises and their forecasts are more divergent than for the 
average earnings surprise firms.  
 The picture that emerges from panel A of Table 7 is that the firms with extreme earnings 
surprises are extreme on other dimensions as well.  They have the largest current sales, are either 
the least or most profitable, have the fewest number of analysts following them, and the greatest 
amount of disagreement between the analysts’ forecasts prior to the earnings announcement.   
The stock return in the three days around the earnings announcement is monotonically increasing 
across the surprise portfolios, as shown in the last column in panel A, so the market is not 
completely unaware of the news in the earnings surprise.  However, the subsequent returns 
documented earlier show that the announcement period reaction is far from complete. 
 Next we examine how the firm and analyst characteristics change over the three years 
after the earnings announcement.  First, do firms with extreme earnings surprises generate more 
surprises in the future?  For each of the 10 original earnings surprise portfolios, Figure 3 graphs 
the median earnings surprise over the next 12 quarters.  The future Surprise variables are 
constructed exactly like the original Surprise variable except that we continue to scale by market 
price from the fiscal quarter preceding the original earnings announcement in order to keep the 
scaling variable constant through time.  In a world with fully rational forecasting, the past 
forecast error should not predict future forecast errors.  Nonetheless, Figure 3 shows a 
remarkable amount of persistence in forecast errors for the extreme portfolios.   The firms in the 
top portfolio of earnings surprise have positive forecast errors in all of the next 12 quarters, and 
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the firms in the bottom portfolio of earnings surprise have negative forecast errors for the next 
four quarters.17  The underreaction in the stock price is mirrored by an underreaction in future 
analyst forecasts. 
 Panel B of Table 7 examines the changes in financial performance and analyst behavior 
during the three years after the earnings announcement.  What causes the market to correct the 
mispricing?  In terms of the future financial performance, the median change in sales over the 
next three years is highest in the two most extreme earnings surprise portfolios.  Sales growth, 
however, does not necessarily create value.  The median change in cash from operations over the 
next three years is lowest for bottom surprise portfolio and the highest for the top surprise 
portfolio.  The median 3-year change in GAAP Earnings shows a similar pattern, although the 
top surprise portfolio isn’t quite the largest value.  The firms in the top portfolio converted the 
sales growth to cash growth and earnings growth while the firms in the bottom portfolio did not.  
Loosely speaking, the future return in the top surprise portfolio is “earned” in the sense that the 
future financial performance of these firms is exceptionally strong. 
 The final evidence we have about the market correction is seen in the future analyst 
variables.  In the three years following the earnings announcement firms in the top portfolio of 
earnings surprise gain a little over one more analyst, on average, while the firms in the bottom 
surprise portfolio gain an average of only .36 analysts.  The analyst community is “waking up” to 
the firms in the top surprise portfolio over the next three years, perhaps because they keep 
reporting positive earnings surprises or perhaps because they report exceptionally strong 
financial performance.  In addition, the standard deviation of analyst forecasts decreases the most 
                                                 
17 These results are consistent with the positive autocorrelation in Valueline forecast errors documented in 
Mendenhall (1991), Abarbanell and Bernard (1992), and Shane and Brous (2001). 
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for firms in the bottom and top surprise portfolios.  As the future earnings surprises dissipate for 
the extreme firms, there is greater consensus among the future analyst forecasts. 
 The evidence in Table 7 suggests that the firms in the extreme earnings surprise 
portfolios are classic “neglected” stocks.  They are smaller, have higher book to market ratios, 
have less analyst coverage and more dispersion in analysts’ forecasts than firms in the other 
surprise portfolios.  Besides the earnings surprise itself, other clues that the firms in the extreme 
portfolios will differ in their future returns are their large sales as a percent of market value and 
their extreme profitability.   Over the next three years, the firms in the top surprise portfolio 
continue to outperform on a financial basis, turning the future sales growth into profit.  They 
attract more analyst attention and the mispricing that was present at the portfolio formation date 
is corrected. 
 
What Should the Announcement Return Be? 
 Another way to interpret our results is to ask, what would the announcement period 
return have been in an efficient market?  A number of studies have documented an S-shaped 
relation between the announcement period return and unexpected earnings, where unexpected 
earnings is the earnings surprise variable as defined earlier [see Freeman and Tse 1992 for a 
summary).  The interpretation of this pattern is generally that extreme earnings have a greater 
transitory component and hence the marginal value diminishes as the earnings become more 
extreme.  But if the market significantly misprices extreme earnings then this interpretation may 
be incorrect.  In Figure 4 we plot the announcement period return (computed over the three days 
surrounding the earnings announcement) against the mean earnings surprise in each portfolio, 
getting the familiar S-shaped curve.  We then plot the hypothetically efficient announcement 
 22
return that would result in a zero market-adjusted return for each portfolio in the two-year post-
announcement period.18  Note that the pattern for the efficient return resembles a check-mark 
more than an S-curve.  To be fully efficient the announcement return for firms with negative 
earnings surprises should actually be lower across the board.  For all positive earnings surprises 
the fully efficient announcement return is larger than the actual announcement return.  The most 
extreme positive earnings surprise portfolio shows a diminishing marginal effect for the efficient 
return but the relation is still much steeper than the almost flat relation shown for the actual 
announcement return.  Restating our main results, firms that report large positive earnings 




 By defining the earnings surprise relative to the consensus analyst forecast rather than 
relative to a time-series expectation, we document a price drift following an earnings 
announcement that is far bigger and longer lived than previously documented.  The magnitude of 
the future return, the average size of the firms in the extreme portfolios, and the fact that most of 
the hedge return is earned by the long position make it unlikely that transaction costs prohibit the 
exploitation of this “earnings surprise” anomaly.19  Rather, it appears extreme positive earnings 
news is less transitory than the market anticipates and, as firms with large positive surprises 
                                                 
18 The hypothetical announcement period return is (1+ra)(1+r2)-1, where ra is the actual announcement period return 
and r2 is the two-year return beginning two days after the announcement period.   
19 The real-world implementability of a trading strategy by a money manager depends on a number of factors 
beyond the simple transaction cost, including restrictions on holdings to less than 5% of the outstanding stock, 
prohibitions on short-sales and price pressure.  See Bushee and Raedy [2004] for an excellent examination of these 
issues. 
 23
continue to outperform financially, they attract more analyst attention which eventually 
eliminates their underpricing. 
 As financial accounting research continues to explore the implications of market 
inefficiency, this simple but large anomaly opens new doors for examining the underlying causes 
of market mispricing and the stimulus for the subsequent market correction. 
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FIGURE 1 
Coefficient Estimates on Surprise Variables for Each Quarter  

















































The quarterly regression coefficients measure the return on a portfolio that takes a long position in the top Surprise portfolio and a 
short position in the bottom Surprise portfolio, after controlling for the other risk variables in equation 2 (see Table 4).  Surprise is the 
un-split-adjusted IBES actual earnings per share for quarter t less the most recent IBES median forecast preceding the announcement 
date, scaled by the market price per share at the end of the fiscal quarter as reported by IBES.   
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FIGURE 2 
Coefficient Estimates on Surprise Variables for Each Year  




















































The regressions are estimated by fiscal quarter with one-year future returns as the dependent variable, thereby eliminating any overlap 
in the return periods.  The annual regression coefficients measure the return on a portfolio that takes a long position in the top Surprise 
portfolio and a short position in the bottom Surprise portfolio, after controlling for the other risk variables in equation 2 (see Table 4).  
Surprise is the un-split-adjusted IBES actual earnings per share for quarter t less the most recent IBES median forecast preceding the 
announcement date, scaled by the market price per share at the end of the fiscal quarter as reported by IBES. 
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FIGURE 3 
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Surprise is the un-split-adjusted IBES actual earnings per share for quarter t less the most recent IBES median forecast preceding the announcement date, scaled 
by the market price per share at the end of the fiscal quarter as reported by IBES.  The figure shows the median Surprise for the current quarter (#0) and for 
twelve subsequent quarters (#1 to #12).  The median Surprise in the current quarter (not shown above) for the lowest and highest Surprise portfolios is -0.0232 
and 0.0090, respectively. 
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FIGURE 4 
Actual and Efficient Announcement Period Returns for each 


























The hypothetically efficient return is the market-adjusted, compounded return starting one day prior to the earnings announcement and ending after two years.  If 
this were the announcement period return, then the two-year market-adjusted return subsequent to the announcement would be zero.  Earnings Surprise is the un-
split-adjusted IBES actual earnings per share for quarter t less the most recent IBES median forecast preceding the announcement date, scaled by the price per 
share at the end of quarter t.   The returns are buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns, inclusive of all distributions, where the market adjustment subtracts the 
returns on a value-weighted market index.  Announcement period returns begin one trading day before the earnings announcement for quarter t and end one 
trading day after the announcement.   Two-year returns begin two days after the earnings announcement for quarter t and extend two years into the future.  In the 







Variables Mean 25% Median 75% 
Ret1yr 0.005 -0.363 -0.078 0.215 
Ret2yr -0.001 -0.600 -0.160 0.289 
Ret3yr -0.029 -0.817 -0.259 0.331 
Surprise -0.0031 -0.0020 0.0000 0.0015 
Beta 0.99 0.57 0.92 1.33 
Market Value ($M) 1,737 97 293 1,040 
Book to Market 0.57 0.29 0.48 0.74 
Accruals -0.018 -0.031 -0.007 0.007 
Momentum 0.003 -0.272 -0.057 0.163 
Pro Forma Exclusions 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SUE 0.086 -0.612 0.103 0.886 
Total Assets ($M) 2,775 94 335 1,479 
Number of Analysts 4.7 2.0 3.0 6.0 
Forecast Dispersion 0.038 0.010 0.020 0.040 
 
The sample consists of 159,789 firm-quarters from 1988 to 2000 with the data necessary to calculate the Surprise 
variable from IBES and Ret1yr from CRSP.  Ret1yr, Ret2yr and Ret3yr are the market-adjusted, buy and hold stock 
returns, inclusive of all distributions, beginning 2 days after the earnings announcement for quarter t and extending 1 
year, 2 years or 3 years into the future, respectively.  The returns are market adjusted by subtracting the returns on a 
value-weighted market portfolio.  In the event of delisting, CRSP’s delisting return is first used, adjusting for the 
delisting bias documented in Shumway [1997], followed by the return on a value-weighted market portfolio.  
Surprise is the un-split-adjusted IBES actual earnings per share for quarter t less the most recent IBES median 
forecast preceding the announcement date, scaled by the market price per share at the end of the fiscal quarter as 
reported by IBES.  Beta is estimated using weekly returns over the two years prior to quarter t.  Market Value is the 
market value of equity at the end of quarter t (Compustat data item #61 times #14).  Book to Market is the book 
value of equity at the end of quarter t (#60) divided by the market value of equity at the end of quarter t (#61 times 
#14).  Accruals are computed as GAAP earnings per share for quarter t (#19) minus cash from operations per share 
for quarter t (#108 divided by #15), scaled by the market price per share at the end of the fiscal quarter (#14).  
Momentum is calculated as the market-adjusted (value-weighted) stock return for the six months prior to the 
earnings announcement, ending two days before the earnings announcement date.  Pro Forma Exclusions are 
measured as the un-split-adjusted IBES actual earnings per share for quarter t less either the basic or diluted GAAP 
earnings per share for quarter t (#9 or #19), depending on the IBES basic/diluted flag, scaled by the market price per 
share at the end of the fiscal quarter (#14).  Total Assets is defined as the total assets at the end of quarter t (#44).  
Number of Analysts is the number of analysts making earnings forecasts at quarter t, as reported by IBES.  Forecast 
Dispersion is the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts for quarter t, as reported by IBES.  SUE is 
standardized unexpected earnings.  The numerator of SUE is equal to actual earnings before extraordinary items 
(Compustat data item #8) minus an expectation based on a seasonal random walk with trend.  The trend is calculated 
as the mean seasonal change in actual earnings beginning with (Q t-1 – Q t-5 ) and using up to 36 quarters of history, if 
available.  If at least 8 seasonal changes are not available to calculate the trend term, the observation is deleted.  The 
denominator of SUE is the standard deviation of this measure of unexpected earnings over the past 8 quarters.  If this 
measure of unexpected earnings is not available from Compustat for any of the prior eight quarters, the observation 
is deleted.  All non-return variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%, except for SUE, which is winsorized at values of 
-5 and +5.   
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TABLE 2 




















1 16,254  -0.0397 -0.0458 -0.0496 -0.0943 
2 15,830 -0.0120 -0.0062 -0.0195 -0.0537 -0.0581 
3 15,618 -0.0042 -0.0023 -0.0441 -0.0781 -0.1181 
4 8,050 -0.0016 -0.0013 0.0151 -0.0188 -0.0184 
5 26,344 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0394 -0.0668 -0.1198 
6 13,007 -0.0000 0.0002 0.0065 -0.0009 -0.0199 
7 16,913 0.0004 0.0007 0.0197 0.0164 -0.0019 
8 15,940 0.0011 0.0016 0.0344 0.0385 -0.0093 
9 15,843 0.0023 0.0033 0.0588 0.0903 0.0641 
10 15,990 0.0052 0.0126 0.0937 0.1493 0.1426 





The sample consists of 159,789 firm-quarters from 1988 to 2000 with the data necessary to calculate the 
Surprise variable from IBES and Ret1yr from CRSP.  The ten portfolios based on the Surprise variable 
are not equal because the groups are defined by the decile cutoffs for the Surprise variable from the 
previous quarter (to avoid a look-ahead bias).  Due to this adjustment, the actual sample begins in the 
second quarter of 1988.  In the typical quarter more than 10 percent of the earnings surprises have the 
value of zero.  In this case we assign all zeros the same decile rank (typically 5).  While this causes the 
portfolios adjacent to the portfolio of zeros to have proportionally fewer observations, it preserves the 
proper rank-ordering of the data.  Surprise is the unadjusted IBES actual earnings per share for quarter t 
less the most recent IBES median forecast preceding the announcement date, scaled by the market price 
per share at the end of the fiscal quarter as reported by IBES.  Ret1yr, Ret2yr, and Ret3yr are the market-
adjusted, buy and hold stock returns, inclusive of all distributions, beginning 2 days after the earnings 
announcement for quarter t and extending 1 year, 2 years or 3 years into the future, respectively.  The 
returns are market adjusted by subtracting the returns on a value-weighted market portfolio.  In the event 
of delisting, CRSP’s delisting return is first used, adjusting for the delisting bias documented in Shumway 
[1997], followed by the return on a value-weighted market portfolio.  The Hedge return is the mean return 




Quarterly Regressions of Future Returns on 
Earnings Surprise Portfolios and Control Variables 
 
Return Interval = α0 + α1Surpriset + α2 Betat + α3Book to Markett + α4Sizet + α5Accrualst + 
α6Momentumt + α7Pro Forma Exclusionst + α8SUEt + εt 
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The sample consists of firm-quarters from 1988 to 2000 with available data from IBES, CRSP, and Compustat.  The 
sample sizes are 85,368, 76,298, and 67,256 for the one, two, and three year time horizons, respectively.  Regressions 
are estimated quarterly and mean coefficients are presented.  Fama-Macbeth t-statistics, adjusted for serial correlation 
using the Newey-West correction are shown in parentheses below the coefficients.  Ret1yr, Ret2yr and Ret3yr are the 
market-adjusted, buy and hold stock returns, inclusive of all distributions, beginning 2 days after the earnings 
announcement for quarter t and extending 1 year, 2 years or 3 years into the future, respectively.  The returns are 
market adjusted by subtracting the returns on a value-weighted market portfolio.  In the event of delisting, CRSP’s 
delisting return is first used, adjusting for the delisting bias documented in Shumway [1997], followed by the return on 
a value-weighted market portfolio.  Surprise is the un-split-adjusted IBES actual earnings per share for quarter t less the 
most recent IBES median forecast preceding the announcement date, scaled by the market price per share at the end of 
the fiscal quarter as reported by IBES.  Beta is estimated using weekly returns over the two years prior to quarter t.  
Size, is the log of the market value of equity at the end of quarter t (#61 times #14).  Book to Market, is the book value 
of equity at the end of quarter t (#60) divided by the market value of equity at the end of quarter t (#61 times #14).  
Accruals are computed as GAAP earnings per share for quarter t (#19) minus cash from operations per share for quarter 
t (#108 divided by #15), scaled by market price per share at the end of the fiscal quarter as reported by IBES.  
Momentum is calculated as the market-adjusted (value-weighted) stock return for the six months prior to the earnings 
announcement, ending two days before the earnings announcement date.  Pro Forma Exclusions are measured as the 
un-split-adjusted IBES actual earnings per share for quarter t less either the basic or diluted GAAP earnings per share 
for quarter t (#9 or #19), depending on the IBES basic/diluted flag, scaled by the market price per share at the end of 
the fiscal quarter as reported by IBES.  SUE is standardized unexpected earnings.  The numerator of SUE is equal to 
actual earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat data item #8) minus an expectation based on a seasonal random 
walk with trend.  The trend is calculated as the mean seasonal change in actual earnings beginning with (Q t-1 – Q t-5 ) 
and using up to 36 quarters of history, if available.  If at least 8 seasonal changes are not available to calculate the 
trend term, the observation is deleted.  The denominator of SUE is the standard deviation of this measure of 
unexpected earnings over the past 8 quarters.  If this measure of unexpected earnings is not available from Compustat 
for any of the prior eight quarters, the observation is deleted.  All independent variables are assigned to a portfolio 
numbered from 0 to 9 based on the cutoff between deciles from the previous quarter.  This portfolio number is then 




Quarterly Regressions of Future Returns on 
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The sample consists of firm-quarters from 1988 to 2000 with available data from IBES, CRSP, and Compustat.  
The sample sizes are 126,108, 114,003, and 100,632 for the one, two, and three year time horizons, 
respectively.  Regressions are estimated quarterly and mean coefficients are presented.  Fama-Macbeth t-
statistics, adjusted for serial correlation using the Newey-West correction are shown in parentheses below the 
coefficients.  Ret1yr, Ret2yr and Ret3yr are the market-adjusted, buy and hold stock returns, inclusive of all 
distributions, beginning 2 days after the earnings announcement for quarter t and extending 1 year, 2 years or 3 
years into the future, respectively.  The returns are market adjusted by subtracting the returns on a value-
weighted market portfolio.  In the event of delisting, CRSP’s delisting return is first used, adjusting for the 
delisting bias documented in Shumway [1997], followed by the return on a value-weighted market portfolio.  
Surprise is the un-split-adjusted IBES actual earnings per share for quarter t less the most recent IBES median 
forecast preceding the announcement date, scaled by the market price per share at the end of the fiscal quarter 
as reported by IBES.  Beta is estimated using weekly returns over the two years prior to quarter t.  Size, is the 
log of the market value of equity at the end of quarter t (#61 times #14).  Book to Market, is the book value of 
equity at the end of quarter t (#60) divided by the market value of equity at the end of quarter t (#61 times 
#14).  All independent variables are assigned to a portfolio numbered from 0 to 9 based on the cutoff between 
deciles from the previous quarter.  This portfolio number is then divided by 9 to yield a variable that lies 




Sample Concentration by Industry based on 2 Digit SIC Codes 
2 Digit 
SIC 
Code Name of Industry 
% of Surprise 
Portfolio 10 
Sample 
% of Full 
Sample 
% of Surprise 
Portfolio 1 
Sample 
1 Agricultural production- crops 0.3% 0.2% 0.3% 
2 Agricultural production- livestock 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
7 Agricultural services  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
8 Forestry  0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
10 Metal mining  0.9% 0.6% 0.7% 
12 Coal mining  0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
13 Oil and gas extraction  4.1% 2.7% 3.4% 
14 Nonmetallic minerals, except fuels 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
15 General building contractors  1.8% 0.7% 0.8% 
16 Heavy construction contractors 0.4% 0.3% 0.5% 
17 Special trade contractors  0.3% 0.2% 0.4% 
20 Food and kindred products  1.8% 2.1% 1.4% 
21 Tobacco manufactures  0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
22 Textile mill products  0.9% 0.8% 1.0% 
23 Apparel and other textile products 0.9% 0.9% 1.2% 
24 Lumber and wood products  0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 
25 Furniture and fixtures  0.7% 0.8% 0.5% 
26 Paper and allied products  0.8% 1.3% 0.8% 
27 Printing and publishing  1.0% 1.5% 0.7% 
28 Chemicals and allied products  8.6% 6.7% 6.0% 
29 Petroleum and coal products  1.0% 0.7% 0.8% 
30 Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products 1.0% 1.0% 0.9% 
31 Leather and leather products  0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 
32 Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products 1.0% 0.7% 0.7% 
33 Primary metal industries  2.9% 1.8% 2.3% 
34 Fabricated metal products  1.2% 1.2% 1.1% 
35 Industrial machinery and equipment 6.6% 6.2% 8.1% 
36 Electrical and electronic equipment 5.8% 6.5% 6.9% 
37 Transportation equipment  2.5% 2.2% 2.1% 
38 Instruments and related products 5.4% 5.6% 6.2% 
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 0.9% 0.8% 1.3% 
40 Local and interurban passenger transit 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 
41 Motor freight transportation and warehousing 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 
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Table 5 Continued, Sample Concentration by Industry 
2 Digit 
SIC 
Code Name of Industry 
% of Surprise 
Portfolio 10 
Sample 
% of Full 
Sample 
% of Surprise 
Portfolio 1 
Sample 
42 U.S. Postal Service  0.8% 0.8% 1.1% 
44 Water transportation  0.7% 0.4% 0.6% 
45 Transportation by air  1.7% 0.8% 1.4% 
46 Pipelines, except natural gas  0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 
47 Transportation services  0.2% 0.3% 0.1% 
48 Communications  2.7% 2.7% 3.1% 
49 Electric, gas, and sanitary services 4.4% 4.5% 2.6% 
50 Wholesale trade--durable goods 1.8% 2.2% 2.6% 
51 Wholesale trade--nondurable goods 1.1% 1.2% 1.2% 
52 Building materials, hardware, garden supply, 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 
53 General merchandise stores  0.8% 0.9% 1.1% 
54 Food stores  0.7% 0.7% 0.5% 
55 Automotive dealers and gasoline service 0.1% 0.3% 0.2% 
56 Apparel and accessory stores  1.1% 1.1% 1.0% 
57 Furniture, home furnishings and equipment 0.6% 0.7% 0.8% 
58 Eating and drinking places  0.8% 1.5% 1.2% 
59 Miscellaneous retail  1.5% 2.0% 2.3% 
60 Depository institutions  6.7% 8.8% 3.9% 
61 Nondepository credit institutions 0.9% 1.1% 1.1% 
62 Security, commodity brokers, and services 1.3% 0.8% 0.4% 
63 Insurance carriers  4.7% 3.8% 3.0% 
64 Insurance agents, brokers, and service 0.3% 0.6% 0.3% 
65 Real estate  0.3% 0.2% 0.4% 
67 Holding and other investment offices 0.8% 1.0% 1.1% 
70 Hotels, rooming houses, camps, and other 0.2% 0.4% 0.3% 
72 Personal services  0.1% 0.3% 0.3% 
73 Business services  8.7% 10.2% 12.7% 
75 Automotive repair, services, and parking 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 
76 Miscellaneous repair services  0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 
78 Motion pictures  0.6% 0.5% 0.7% 
79 Amusement and recreational services 1.0% 0.8% 1.2% 
80 Health services  0.9% 1.7% 1.4% 
81 Legal services  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
82 Educational services  0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 
83 Social services  0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 
87 Engineering and management services 1.0% 1.4% 1.5% 
99 Misc 0.3% 0.3% 0.6% 
Totals 
 
























1 14,638  -0.0397 -0.0484 -0.0524 -0.0739 
2 14,562 -0.0120 -0.0062 -0.0276 -0.0218 0.0159 
3 14,242 -0.0042 -0.0023 -0.0292 -0.0184 -0.0043 
4 7,475 -0.0016 -0.0013 -0.0094 -0.0109 -0.0223 
5 24,960 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0033 0.0248 0.0689 
6 12,273  0.0000 0.0002 -0.0012 0.0271 0.0243 
7 15,868 0.0004 0.0007 0.0227 0.0693 0.0966 
8 14,864 0.0011 0.0016 0.0456 0.1000 0.0962 
9 14,661 0.0023 0.0033 0.0516 0.1180 0.1243 
10 14,526 0.0052 0.0126 0.0854 0.1800 0.2127 





The sample consists of 148,069 firm-quarters from 1988 to 2000 with the data necessary to calculate the 
Surprise variable from IBES and ARet1yr from CRSP.  The ten portfolios based on the Surprise variable 
are not equal because the groups are defined by the decile cutoffs for the Surprise variable from the 
previous quarter (to avoid a look-ahead bias).  Due to this adjustment, the actual sample begins in the 
second quarter of 1988.  In the typical quarter more than 10 percent of the earnings surprises have the 
value of zero.  In this case we assign all zeros the same decile rank.  While this causes the portfolios 
adjacent to the portfolio of zeros to have proportionally fewer observations, it preserves the proper rank-
ordering of the data.  Surprise is the unadjusted IBES actual earnings per share for quarter t less the most 
recent IBES median forecast preceding the announcement date, scaled by the market price per share at the 
end of the fiscal quarter as reported by IBES.  ARet1yr, ARet2yr, and ARet3yr are the differences in 
returns between a sample observation and a control firm matched on size and book-to-market; for each, 
the buy-and-hold stock returns are inclusive of all distributions, begin 2 days after the earnings 
announcement for quarter t and extend 1 year, 2 years or 3 years into the future, respectively.  The control 
firm observation is from the same fiscal year and quarter, has a market value between 0.70 and 1.30 times 
the treatment firm’s market value and has the closest book-to-market ratio within the matched size subset 
(the procedure is specified in Barber and Lyon [1997]).  In the event of delisting, CRSP’s delisting return 
is first used, adjusting for the delisting bias documented in Shumway [1997], followed by the return on a 
value-weighted market portfolio.  The Hedge return is the mean return on portfolio 10 less the mean 
return on portfolio 1. 
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TABLE 7 
Current and Future Characteristics of Firms in Earnings Surprise Portfolios  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 

































1 -0.0397 388 0.84 0.3921 0.0033 -0.0023 2.75 0.0801 -0.0256 
2 -0.0062 1,089 0.66 0.2668 0.0142 0.0004 3.74 0.0512 -0.0164 
3 -0.0023 1,725 0.56 0.2191 0.0165 0.0005 4.58 0.0402 -0.0119 
4 -0.0013 2,506 0.54 0.2266 0.0181 0.0005 5.63 0.0377 -0.0093 
5 -0.0001 3,091 0.45 0.1797 0.0137 0.0004 6.19 0.0217 -0.0027 
6 0.0002 2,913 0.41 0.1692 0.0138 0.0004 6.45 0.0224 0.0035 
7 0.0007 2,005 0.45 0.1884 0.0153 0.0005 5.68 0.0250 0.0115 
8 0.0016 1,496 0.51 0.2225 0.0181 0.0006 4.80 0.0307 0.0171 
9 0.0033 1,152 0.59 0.2677 0.0208 0.0008 4.12 0.0405 0.0236 
10 0.0126 640 0.74 0.3754 0.0229 0.0011 3.17 0.0633 0.0322 
 























3-year Change in 
Forecast Dispersion 
1 -0.0397 3.611 0.1624 -0.0264 0.36 -0.0552 
2 -0.0062 2.787 0.1970 0.0737 0.54 -0.0177 
3 -0.0023 2.381 0.1979 0.0992 0.47 -0.0065 
4 -0.0013 2.452 0.1949 0.1164 0.53 -0.0006 
5 -0.0001 1.991 0.1748 0.1031 0.91 0.0017 
6 0.0002 1.947 0.1724 0.1155 0.97 0.0024 
7 0.0007 2.163 0.1939 0.1265 1.30 0.0024 
8 0.0016 2.511 0.2073 0.1330 1.22 0.0012 
9 0.0033 2.917 0.2322 0.1440 1.14 -0.0033 
10 0.0126 3.951 0.2364 0.1321 1.05 -0.0228 
 
The sample consists of 159,789 firm-quarters from 1988 to 2000 with the data necessary to calculate the Surprise 
variable from IBES and Ret1yr from CRSP.  Surprise is the un-split-adjusted IBES actual earnings per share for 
quarter t less the most recent IBES median forecast preceding the announcement date, scaled by the market price per 
share at the end of the fiscal quarter as reported by IBES.  Market Value is the market value of equity at the end of 
quarter t (#61 times #14).  Book to Market is the book value of equity at the end of quarter t (#60) divided by the 
market value of equity at the end of quarter t (#61 times #14).  Sales is Compustat data item #2, scaled by the market 
value of equity at the end of the fiscal quarter #61 times #14).  Cash from Operations is defined as cash from 
operations for quarter t (#108), scaled by the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal quarter (#61 times #14).  
GAAP Earnings is basic earnings per share for quarter t (#19), scaled by the market price per share at the end of the 
fiscal quarter (#14).  Number of Analysts is the number of analysts making earnings forecasts at quarter t, as 
reported by IBES.  Forecast Std Dev is the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts for quarter t, as 
reported by IBES.  The 3-year change in Sales, CFO, and Earnings in Panel B are calculated as the sum of the 
particular variable from quarter t+1 to quarter t+12, less the sum of the variable from quarter t-3 to t, scaled by the 
market value of equity at the end of  quarter t (#61 times #14).  The 3-year change in Number of Analysts and 
Forecast Dispersion is the difference between the variable at quarter t+12 and quarter t.  All variables are winsorized 
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